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Competitiveness, Social Justice, and the 
Third Way
'A left-of-centre party today must concern itself with competitiveness 
as well as social justice, and must indeed reconcile the two'
Anthony Giddens, 'Just carry on being new', New Statesman, 11 June 
2001.
'Capitalism has to be made to work in the interests of consumers, 
and in the long-term interests of society'
Anthony Giddens, Over to You, Mr Brown, Polity Press, 2007: 210. 
Introduction
This paper addresses two questions. How are social justice and competitiveness 
reconciled in Giddens' Third Way? And what are the implications for the goal of 
making  capitalism  work  in  the  interests  of  consumers  and  in  the  long-term 
interests of society?
The argument put forward is that the Third Way reconciles competitiveness and 
social justice by redefining social justice, and other key social democratic values 
such as emancipation, in terms of the logic of competitiveness itself. While this 
does not mean that there is no scope for reform in the Third Way, it does mean 
that that there is nothing 'left-of-centre' about it.1 Social democracy, whatever its 
shortcomings, sought to set limits to the operation of capitalism in accordance 
with values derived from a normative framework independent of its logic. The 
Third Way, in contrast, not only accepts that logic, but seeks to perfect it by 
promoting individual  enterprise  and removing  social,  cultural  and institutional 
impediments to competitiveness at every level. As he embraces and pursues so 
wholeheartedly the notion of a perfectible capitalism, what Giddens should say 
is: 'Capitalism has to be made to work. That is in the interests of consumers, and 
in  the  long-term  interests  of  society.'  The  Third  Way (Giddens,  1998) 
systematically subverts the core values of social democracy by re-interpreting 
them so that they fit  with the logic of neoliberalism.  Over to You, Mr Brown 
(Giddens, 2007) continues the same process, and as a consequence reveals the 
intellectual and practical limits of Third Way reformism.
1 'Progressive' reform is not ruled out, but the reforms that are proposed (such as action against 
corruption, the incorporation of more women into the workforce, the further devolution of services 
to community level and even a wealth tax) are all incorporated into an agenda of competitiveness, 
and reflect its limits.
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The Rhetorical Structure of The Third Way
The overt argument of The Third Way is straightforward. Social, economic and 
technological  change has rendered classical  social  democracy obsolete.  Social 
democrats must therefore continue the thorough revision of its content that is 
already under way, steering a middle course between the classical doctrine on 
the  one  hand  and  neoliberalism  on  the  other  –  hence  the  'third  way'.  The 
resulting doctrine will still retain the core values of classical social democracy: 
“The term 'centre-left' thus isn’t an innocent label. A renewed social democracy 
has to be left of centre, because social justice and emancipatory politics remain 
at its core” (ibid: 45). Five dilemmas are identified – the transformation brought 
about  by  globalisation,  the  challenge  posed  by  the  new  individualism,  the 
weakening of the distinction between left and right, the question of the scope for 
political agency on the part of parties and the state, and the need to respond to 
ecological issues. Against this background, Giddens sets out a new agenda for 
the centre-left, based on the twin principles of 'no rights without responsibilities' 
and  'no  authority  without  democracy'  (ibid:  65-66).  Proposals  for  social 
democratic policies modified to meet the needs of the age are then grouped in 
three  chapters,  addressing  in  turn  the  relationship  between  state  and  civil 
society, and the role of the state in the domestic and global arenas respectively. 
On first appearances, then, The Third Way represents an honest effort to fashion 
a new social democratic agenda for the twenty-first century. But appearances are 
deceptive. Surrounding this expository framework is a rhetorical structure that 
tells a very different story. This structure, established in the opening lines and 
carried consistently through the text as a whole,  trashes socialism and social 
democracy in turn, preparing the way for the redefinition of key entries in the 
social  democratic  lexicon  in  a  way  which  assimilates  them to  the  neoliberal 
agenda.  Far  from  being  a  Third  Way,  the  doctrine  proposed  is  a  complete 
capitulation, all the more pernicious because it sows confusion and gets in the 
way of a genuinely social democratic alternative. 
The Third Way as an ideological project 
The first chapter of The Third Way is not called 'Social Democracy and After', or 
'Neoliberalism and After', but 'Socialism and After'. It begins by recalling Blair's 
ambition, announced after a seminar in Washington in February 1998, to “create 
an international consensus of the centre-left for the twenty-first century”, a new 
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approach that would “develop a policy framework to respond to change in the 
global order” (ibid: 1). It notes the absence of an ideology to underpin such a 
framework,  and goes on immediately  to pinpoint  as  the  biggest  problem the 
continuing appeal of socialist values deriving from classical Marxism:
A hundred and fifty years ago Marx wrote that 'a spectre is haunting 
Europe' - the spectre of socialism or communism. This remains true, 
but for different reasons from those Marx had in mind. Socialism and 
communism  have  passed  away,  yet  they  remain  to  haunt  us.  We 
cannot just put aside the values and ideals that drove them, for some 
remain  intrinsic  to  the  good  life  that  it  is  the  point  of  social  and 
economic  development  to  create.  The  challenge  is  to  make  these 
values count where the economic programme of socialism has become 
discredited (ibid: 1-2). 
These opening moves disclose a highly political agenda. It is not after all that “a 
renewed social  democracy has to be left of centre because social  justice and 
emancipatory politics remain at its core”; rather, a New Labour project resolved 
to turn its back on the past has to present itself as renewing social democracy 
and advancing its emancipatory project, and therefore has to  position itself  to 
the left of centre. In Gramscian terms, Giddens proposes himself as the organic 
intellectual of Blair’s regime. In the vernacular, he is saying, “Look, Tony, you 
have a problem. You’ve got to dump socialism and social  democracy, but the 
values with which they are associated still appeal to people. Never mind. Let me 
have a go at attaching those values to policies that will enable you to manage 
and extend the neoliberal programme.” That is the essence of the Third Way. 
The proposal was never to offer a social democratic alternative to neoliberalism, 
but to legitimise neoliberal policies by clothing them in the vocabulary of social 
democracy. Its rhetorical structure is as follows: socialism has failed; classical 
social  democracy  is  obsolete;  solidarity,  emancipation,  security,  community, 
redistribution, equality, and welfare can still be watchwords, but only if they can 
be redefined to meet the needs of the age; appropriately redefined, they can be 
achieved by pursuing neoliberal policies, not by abandoning them; neoliberalism, 
therefore, can be presented as renewed social democracy. It is in accordance 
with this agenda that Giddens sets out to trash socialism and social democracy in 
turn,  as  a  prelude  to  appropriating  their  core  values  for  a  new  and 
uncompromisingly pro-capitalist agenda.
Trashing socialism 
Giddens identifies three components to socialism – a critique of individualism, a 
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critique of  capitalism,  and an  economic  programme designed to humanise or 
overthrow capitalism. The economic programme is identified exclusively with the 
Soviet Union, and the failure of the Soviet Union is presented as the failure of 
socialism for all time: 
Socialism seeks to confront the limitations of  capitalism in order  to 
humanize  it  or  to  overthrow  it  altogether.  The  economic  theory  of 
socialism  depends  upon  the  idea  that,  left  to  its  own  devices, 
capitalism is  economically  inefficient,  socially  divisive  and unable  to 
reproduce itself  in the long term. The notion that capitalism can be 
humanized  through  socialist  economic  management  gives  socialism 
whatever  hard  edge  it  possesses,  even  if  there  have  been  many 
different accounts of how such a goal might be achieved. For Marx, 
socialism stood or fell by its capacity to deliver a society that would 
generate greater wealth than capitalism and spread that wealth in a 
more equitable fashion. If socialism is now dead, it is precisely because 
these claims have collapsed (ibid: 3-4).
 The demise of the Soviet Union does a lot of work here. First of all, it is made to 
stand for all the 'many different accounts' of how socialist economic management 
might  come  about.  Second,  its  failure  curiously  disposes  of  the  idea  that 
capitalism can be either humanised or overthrown. And third,  reference to it 
temporarily allows Giddens to pass in silence over the notion that capitalism, left 
to its own devices, is economically inefficient, or socially divisive, or unable to 
reproduce itself in the long term (a view which he elsewhere endorses). 
The trick is a simple one: to dispose of the  idea of socialism by equating it 
entirely  with  the  specific  form  of  one  historical  example,  much  disputed  as 
Giddens is well aware, and to insinuate that the Marxist critique of capitalism 
falls  at  the  same  time.  The  view  of  socialism  as  monolithic,  unreflective, 
ineffective and obsolete then becomes a key theme of the text, with socialists 
caricatured  as  limited  moral  beings  out  of  touch  with  the  times,  anxious  to 
surrender their personal autonomy, and unthinking about the consequences of 
the lifestyles they adopt. Through this device Giddens avoids the central issues: 
if capitalism continues to be economically inefficient, socially divisive, and unable 
to reproduce itself in the long term, the Marxist critique is a relevant as ever; if 
the project of “humanizing capitalism through socialist economic management” 
(not Marx’s project at all, of course) has failed, it is social democracy rather than 
socialism that  is  called into question; and if  Giddens believes that capitalism 
cannot  be  humanised,  but  must  be  given  its  head,  there  is  nothing  social 
democratic about his project. 
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Trashing social democracy 
Giddens  employs  the  same method  to  dispose  of  classical  social  democracy. 
Classical  or  'old-style'  –  for  which  read  obsolete  –  social  democracy  is  first 
equated  with  the  Keynesian  welfare  consensus,  despite  acknowledgement  of 
liberal and even conservative inspiration and support for the latter. It is then 
condemned for its limited ability to accommodate ecological  concerns, and its 
association with a bipolar world (ibid: 11), before being equated with a social 
system where the husband was the breadwinner and the wife the housewife and 
mother, and identified with such perversions as 'the social engineering which has 
left a legacy of decaying, crime-ridden housing estates' (ibid: 16). 
Social democracy, in short, is reduced to some highly selective features – not 
intrinsic to social democracy itself – of the society in which it appeared. As are 
socialists,  social  democrats are caricatured throughout the text: shy of taking 
responsibility for their own lives, passively dependent on the state, and attracted 
to collectivism as a safe refuge from responsibility and mutual obligation. Not to 
mince  words,  Giddens'  argument  rests  upon  a  foundation  of  distortion, 
tendentious argument, and vulgar abuse. 
This  underpinning  rhetorical  structure  is  not  incidental.  It  turns  out  to  be 
essential to the discursive move Giddens has to make: “Social democracy was 
always linked to socialism. What should its orientation be in a world where there 
are  no  alternatives  to  capitalism?”  (ibid:  24).  The  answer  not  spoken  here, 
'capitalist, stupid', is stated later: 
With the demise of socialism as a theory of economic management, 
one of the major division lines between left and right has disappeared, 
at least for the forseeable future. The Marxist left wished to overthrow 
capitalism  and  replace  it  with  a  different  system.  Many  social 
democrats  also  believed  that  capitalism  could  and  should  be 
progressively  modified  so  that  it  would  lose  most  of  its  defining 
characteristics. No one any longer has any alternatives to capitalism – 
the  arguments  that  remain  concern  how  far,  and  in  what  ways, 
capitalism should be governed and regulated (ibid: 43-44). 
Here, notice, the difference between Marxist and social democratic projects is 
clearly marked in a way that could not be admitted earlier. At the same time the 
perception of capitalism as 'economically inefficient, socially divisive, and unable 
to secure its reproduction in the long term' has entirely vanished, as has the idea 
of humanising it. Giddens has managed to reach the essential conclusion that the 
new social democracy must embrace and work with the logic of capitalism. 
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New Meanings for Old Values
With the mood set by the trashing of socialism and social democracy, socialists 
and social democrats, Giddens can proceed to the crucial task of appropriating 
the vocabulary and values of social democracy for his own project.  From this 
point on the text is a work of 'semantic engineering' – making words mean what 
Giddens chooses them to mean. One by one, key points of reference for social 
democracy  –  solidarity,  emancipation,  security,  community,  redistribution, 
equality, and welfare – are taken up and redefined in terms appropriate to the 
market-friendly individualism of neoliberal doctrine. 
The first step is to replace solidarity or collective responsibility as the starting 
point with individualism, thereby shifting from a socialist to a liberal framework 
of  values.  The  second  is  to  propose  that  in  the  contemporary  world  the 
emancipated  individual  is  the  one  who  assumes  responsibility  for  their  own 
future. The third is to have 'security' incorporate insecurity, in the form of risk. 
With this framework in place, community, redistribution, equality, and welfare 
can  be  redefined  in  ways  compatible  with  the  social,  economic  and  political 
demands of contemporary capitalism. 
Individualism is Solidarity
Giddens  contrasts  solidarity,  or  collectivism,  with  the  narrow  'me-first' 
individualism  sometimes  associated  with  neoliberalism.  He  then  slips  in  two 
characteristic moves. First he remarks, almost in passing, that “The idea of the 
'autonomous individual', after all, was the very notion that socialism grew up in 
order to contest” (ibid: 35). Then he implies that socialists have lacked authentic 
moral  autonomy by presenting the 'new generations'  in  apparent contrast  as 
autonomous moral beings: 
The  'me'  generation  is  a  misleading  description  of  the  new 
individualism, which does not signal a process of moral decay. Rather 
to  the  contrary,  surveys  show  that  younger  generations  today  are 
sensitized  to  a  greater  range  of  moral  concerns  than  previous 
generations  were.  They  do  not,  however,  relate  these  values  to 
tradition,  or  accept  traditional  forms  of  authority  as  legislating  on 
questions of lifestyle’ (ibid: 35-6). 
Socialists  do, one must conclude. Worse, again by implication, socialists and 
social democrats alike have failed to live in an 'open and reflective manner': 
Social cohesion cannot be guaranteed by the top-down action of the 
state or by appeal to tradition. We have to make our lives in a more 
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active way than was true or previous generations, and we need more 
actively to accept responsibilities for the consequences of what we do 
and  the  lifestyle  habits  we  adopt.  The  theme  of  responsibility,  or 
mutual obligation,  was there in old-style social  democracy, but was 
largely  dormant,  since  it  was  submerged  within  the  concept  of 
collective provision. We have to find a new balance between individual 
and collective responsibilities today. … All of us have to live in a more 
open and reflective manner than previous generations (ibid: 37). 
Giddens  shies  away  from implicating  socialists  directly,  overtly  directing  his 
comment to old-style social democracy. But the idea left hanging in the air is 
that socialists lacked authenticity, moral responsibility, commitment to a set of 
values and a lifestyle that reflected it. The implication, put plainly, is that past 
generations  of  socialists,  across  the  world,  have  surrendered  active  moral 
judgement  in  mindless  subjection  to  state-imposed  collectivism.  Giddens 
manages  to  present  the  'me'  generation  as  more  morally  authentic  than 
committed socialists and social democrats, by depicting socialists as hedonistic 
and unthinking consumers of collective doctrine and the consumption-oriented 
element of contemporary generations as superior moral beings. He can allow no 
place for conviction or commitment to principle, nor can he recognise that the 
'concept of collective provision,' where it was advocated, was justified directly by 
appeal to the values of mutual obligation and responsibility. 
This is perverse, not least because section opens with the acknowledgement 
(swiftly forgotten) that Marx envisaged a society in which “the free development 
of each will be the condition of the free development of all” (ibid: 34). It ends 
with  the  claim  that  'leftish  critics'  dismiss  ideas  of  self-fulfilment  and  the 
fulfilment of potential as “just forms of therapy-talk, or the self-indulgence of the 
affluent” (ibid: 37). The cap fits Giddens better – it is contemporary anti-Marxists 
of  his  sort  who have  detached the  idea  of  self-fulfilment  from any social  or 
political context, interpreted it in purely individual, subjective and psychological 
terms,  robbed  it  of  its  critical  power,  and  converted  it  into  therapy-talk.  Of 
course the association of  contemporary individualism with 'me-first'  hedonism 
misses a great deal, as Giddens rightly notes. But he cannot also note, without 
breaking the stick with which he wants to beat socialists, that those who are 
most sensitised to moral concerns and hostile to selfish consumerism are also 
closest to traditional socialist and social-democratic values, and least committed 
to the all-out support for capitalism he advocates. No matter. He conjures up a 
new meaning for an old word: individualism, he contends, is the new solidarity. 
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Responsibility is Emancipation 
What, then, of the emancipatory project of social democracy? How is the new 
individual  to  be  emancipated’  Giddens  begins  by  detaching  the  idea  of 
emancipation from social justice: “Rather than speaking of social justice as such, 
it is more accurate to say that to be on the left is to believe in a politics of 
emancipation” (ibid: 41). Emancipation is then associated with an entirely new 
set of issues. Immediately after declaring that there is no longer any alternative 
to capitalism (thereby ruling out a set  of  meanings emancipation once had), 
Giddens says: “To the emancipatory politics of the classical left we have to add 
what I have elsewhere called life politics. The term may or may not be a good 
one.  What  I  mean by  it  is  that,  whereas  emancipatory  politics  concerns  life 
chances,  life  politics  concerns  life  decisions”  (ibid:  44).  In  sum,  he  replaces 
emancipation  from  capitalist  exploitation  with  respect  for  different  lifestyle 
choices,  and  adherence  to  a  new politics  of  “choice,  identity  and  mutuality” 
(ibid).  The direction  in  which  the argument tends becomes clear  later,  when 
Giddens sets out the framework of emancipatory politics that is the core content 
of the Third Way in a way that enables him to bring social justice back in: 
Third way politics should preserve a core concern with social justice, 
while accepting that the range of questions which escape the left/right 
divide is greater than before. … Freedom to social democrats should 
mean autonomy of action, which in turn demands the involvement of 
the wider social community. Having abandoned collectivism, third way 
politics  looks for  a new relationship between the individual  and the 
community, a redefinition of rights and obligations. One might suggest 
as a prime motto for the new politics, no rights without responsibilities 
(ibid: 65). 
In Giddens' land of wonders wild and new, then, emancipation comes not from 
deliverance  from the  social  oppression  inherent  in  the  unequal  structures  of 
capitalism, but from the individual exercise of personal responsibility, while the 
status of  social  justice is  left  unclear.  Responsibility,  it  turns out,  is the new 
emancipation. 
Risk is Security 
The focus of Giddens' renewed social democracy, then, is on individuals taking 
responsibility for themselves. The idea of risk as a central and essential element 
of contemporary social life underpins the shift to the 'new individualism' and acts 
as a unifying principle for the text as a whole. The topic is introduced by way of a 
lengthy discussion of ecological risk and the BSE crisis, and the problem posed 
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for the government of managing the presentation of the risk to citizens. But at 
the end of a section entitled 'Ecological Issues' Giddens leaps onto an entirely 
different  terrain,  moving  from  the  issue  of  ecological  risk  to  something 
completely different: the successful market economy. Suddenly the emphasis is 
on the structures and institutions needed to shape the risk environment in which 
individuals are placed in order to maximize the likelihood that they will play the 
roles the market economy requires of them:
Providing  citizens  with  security  has  long  been  a  concern  of  social 
democrats. The welfare state has been seen as the vehicle  of  such 
security.  One  of  the  main  lessons  to  be  drawn  from  ecological 
questions is that just as much attention needs to be given to risk. The 
new prominence of risk connects individual autonomy on the one hand 
with the sweeping influence of scientific and technological change on 
the other.  Risk draws attention to the dangers we face – the most 
important of which we have created for ourselves – but also to the 
opportunities  that  go  along  with  them.  Risk  is  not  just  a  negative 
phenomenon – something to be avoided or  minimized.  It  is  at  the 
same time the energizing principle of a society that has broken away 
from tradition and nature (ibid: 62-63). 
Passing over for now the preposterous implication that BSE should be embraced 
as an opportunity to take an energising risk, we observe the same technique as 
was  applied  to  'solidarity',  where  the  link  between  mutual  responsibility  and 
collective provision was broken, allowing the two terms to be contrasted, and the 
values of social democracy were attached to the former in apparent opposition to 
the latter. Here the proposition that the welfare state protects citizens from risk 
– the risk of illness, the risk of starvation, the risk of unemployment, the risk of 
homelessness – is turned around. The suggestion is allowed to slip in that the 
welfare state reflected a continuum with tradition and nature, rather than an 
attempt to protect citizens from risks “which we have created ourselves.” The 
issue of responsibility,  in this topsy-turvy account, arises after not before the 
introduction of social provision through the welfare state. Again, such sleight of 
hand is not innocent. It enables Giddens to sneak up on his ultimate objective – 
the presentation of the risk involved in direct exposure to market forces as an 
integral and appropriate part of the renewal of social democracy:
Opportunity and innovation are the positive side of risk. No one can 
escape risk,  of  course,  but there is  a basic  difference  between the 
passive  experience  of  risk  and  the  active  exploration  of  risk 
environments.  A  positive  engagement  with  risk  is  a  necessary 
component of social and economic mobilization. Some risks we wish to 
minimize  as  far  as  possible;  others,  such  as  those  involved  in 
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investment decisions, are a positive and inevitable part of a successful 
market economy (ibid: 63-4). 
And he elaborates later: 
A high rate of business formation and dissolution is characteristic of a 
dynamic economy. This flux is not compatible with a society where 
taken-for-granted  habits  dominate,  including  those  generated  by 
welfare  systems.  Social  democrats  have  to  shift  the  relationship 
between risk and security involved in the welfare state, to develop a 
society  of  'responsible  risk  takers'  in  the  spheres  of  government, 
business enterprise and labour markets (ibid: 100). 
Giddens is of course quite at liberty to embrace the logic of new right public 
choice theory, and propose the explicit redefinition of the role of the state and 
the rights of the individual in ways that expose them to the logic of capital. But it 
is a bit much to dress the argument up in the language of social democracy. 
To  recapitulate:  in  a  section  entitled  'ecological  issues,'  launched  with  a 
discussion  of  BSE,  Giddens  has  found  his  way  to  the  conclusion  that  a 
contemporary understanding of security must incorporate structured insecurity 
through exposure to the risk of market forces, and has claimed that this thought 
can  sit  comfortably  within  the  social  democratic tradition.  The  John  Selwyn 
Gummer of the risk society, he would compel us all to bite fearlessly into the 
beefburger of market forces. Risk, it seems, is the new security.
Enterprise is Community 
With the conceptual framework of individualism, responsibility and risk in place, 
and the connection made to the broad theme of furthering the conditions for 
capitalist reproduction, Giddens can make short work of reinterpreting other key 
social democratic watchwords in explicitly pro-market, neoliberal terms. To start 
with community: “'Community' doesn’t imply trying to recapture lost forms of 
local solidarity; it refers to practical means of furthering the social and material 
refurbishment of neighbourhoods, towns, and larger local areas” (ibid: 79). The 
practical  means  in  question  will  be  activated  by  unleashing  the  spirit  of 
entrepreneurialism: “The renewal of deprived local communities presumes the 
encouragement of economic enterprise as a means of generating a broader civic 
recovery”  (ibid:  82).  So the  heroes  of  renewed  social  democracy  are  young 
business leaders and private corporations, and the preferred social democratic 
policy options are the introduction of 'time dollar' accounting systems to create 
financial assets from individual charitable activity (ibid: 83) and incentives for 
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private  corporations  to  make  investments:  “tax  breaks  for  corporations  that 
participate in strategic planning and offer investment in designated areas” (ibid: 
88).2 Entrepreneurs are the new heroes of social democracy. Giddens proposes 
the commodification of  community  activity,  and its  explicit  placing under  the 
sway of capital. Enterprise, it seems, is the new community. 
Opportunity is Redistribution 
Having explained earlier that where social democrats have wanted to expand the 
state and neoliberals to shrink it, the Third Way “argues that what is necessary is 
to reconstruct it” (ibid: 70), Giddens now proceeds to reconstruct it in ways that 
are entirely supportive of the market economy. Proposing first that government 
“has  an  essential  role  to  play  in  investing  in  the  human  resources  and 
infrastructure  needed  to  develop  an  entrepreneurial  culture”  (ibid:  99),  he 
declares that the new mixed economy looks for “a synergy between public and 
private sectors, utilizing the dynamism of markets but with the public interest in 
mind” (ibid: 100). This requires a radical reformulation of redistribution, in which 
the transfer of resources from the rich to the poor has little place: 
For reasons I shall give below, redistribution must not disappear from 
the agenda of social  democracy. But recent discussion among social 
democrats  has  quite  rightly  shifted  the  emphasis  towards  the 
‘redistribution  of  possibilities’.  The  cultivation  of  human  potential 
should as far as possible replace 'after the event' redistribution (ibid, 
pp. 100-101). 
Redistribution  cannot  disappear  from  the  agenda,  of  course,  for  the  same 
reasons  that  emancipation  and social  justice  cannot.  The  solution  is  by  now 
familiar: redefine it in such a way that it is no longer actually redistribution as 
such. In Giddens' new dispensation, opportunity is the new redistribution.
Inclusion is Equality 
It is clear that Giddens will have no truck with equality as generally understood 
in  the  social  democratic  tradition.  Having  first  announced  that  “Equality  and 
individual  liberty  can  come  into  conflict,  and  it  is  no  good  pretending  that 
equality, pluralism and economic dynamism are always compatible” (ibid: 100), 
he  offers  the  following  thought,  explicitly  signalling  for  once  the  process  of 
redefinition of key terms: “What then should equality be taken to mean? The new 
politics defines equality as inclusion and inequality as exclusion, although these 
2 As Giddens might have added: Charity was always linked to altruism. What should its orientation 
be in a world where there are no alternatives to self-interest?
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terms need some spelling out” (ibid: 102). Education and training turn out to be 
the  key:  “Governments  need  to  emphasize  life-long  education,  developing 
education programmes that start from an individual’s early years and continue 
on  even  late  in  life”  (ibid:  125,  emphasis  in  the  original);  with  a  neoliberal 
proviso, however: “Instead of relying on unconditional benefits, policies should 
be oriented to encourage saving,  the use of  educational  resources  and other 
personal  investment  opportunities”  (ibid).  Giddens  is  on  a  roll.  Inclusion, 
optimally at one’s own expense, is the new equality.
Self-Help is Welfare 
This brings him to the central principle of social democracy: welfare. Adherents 
to the ideals of social democracy have unaccountably got this completely wrong:
When  Beveridge  wrote  his  Report  on  Social  Insurance  and  Allied 
Services,  in  1942,  he  famously  declared  war  on  Want,  Disease, 
Ignorance, Squalor, and Idleness. In other words, his focus was almost 
entirely negative. We should speak today of positive welfare, to which 
individuals  themselves  and  other  agencies  besides  government 
contribute – and which is functional for wealth creation. Welfare is not 
in essence an economic concept, but a psychic one (ibid: 117). 
Well,  who would have thought it? You learn something every day. It follows, 
naturally, that “counselling, for example, might sometimes be more helpful than 
direct economic support” (ibid). This leads in turn to a straightforward workfare 
stance on unemployment benefits: 
Old-style  social  democracy  ..  was  inclined  to  treat  rights  as 
unconditional  claims.  With  expanding  individualism  should  come an 
extension  of  individual  obligations.  Unemployment  benefits,  for 
example, should carry the obligation actively to look for work, and it is 
up to governments to ensure that welfare systems do not discourage 
active search (ibid: 65). 
Later, the circle back to risk (the new security) is completed in true new right 
style: “Benefit systems should be reformed where they induce moral hazard, and 
a  more  active  risk-taking  attitude  encouraged,  wherever  possible  through 
incentives, but where necessary by legal obligations” (ibid: 122). Such are the 
virtues of this progressive stance – reflected in suggestions that pensions could 
be abolished, and children could be obliged to care for elderly parents – that it 
frees resources so that welfare as traditionally understood can be directed to 
where it is needed most. Once the poor learn to invest in their own education to 
spare the state the expense and to keep themselves attractive to capitalists,
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Government policy can provide direct support for for entrepreneurship, 
through helping create venture capital, but also through restructuring 
welfare  systems  to  give  security  when  entrepreneurial  ventures  go 
wrong – for example, by giving people the option to be taxed on a 
two- or three-year cycle rather than only annually. ...The public sector 
can in turn provide resources that can help enterprises to flourish and 
without which joint projects may fail (ibid, pp. 124-5).
 For  capitalists, welfare is the redistribution of real resources. But for  workers, 
self-help is the new welfare. 
The Politics of the Third Way
In The Third Way and Its Critics (Giddens, 2000) Giddens offers a reprise of the 
Third Way, arguing that it is market-friendly but not neoliberal, endorsing the 
Blair-Schröder  argument  that  “the  essential  function  of  markets  must  be 
complemented and improved by political action, not hampered by it” (ibid: 6). As 
this suggests, it is not an agenda of passive submission to market forces. Nor 
does it propose that the state should be the instrument of the large corporations, 
or of industrial or financial capital. It is a call for the state to exercise a degree of 
autonomy over capitalists and workers alike, in order to ensure as best it can 
that all act in ways compatible with the logic of capitalist accumulation. The state 
is  to  be  reconstructed  as  a  regulator  and  support  for  markets,  as,  left  to 
themselves, they breed crisis and instability. 
 In  this  context  the  claim  that  “Third  way  politics  is  not  a  continuation  of 
neoliberalism,  but  an  alternative  political  philosophy  to  it”  depends  upon the 
assertion that “the neoliberal idea that markets should almost everywhere stand 
in place of public goods is ridiculous’” (ibid: 32). But this is only half right – the 
idea is ridiculous, but it is not neoliberal. To think so confuses neoliberalism with 
laissez-faire  liberalism,  and  overlooks  the  neoliberal  call  for  a  strong  state 
selectively engaged in a new set of active policies aiming to create a framework 
within which markets can flourish – exactly the position Giddens adopts: 
The left has to get comfortable with markets, with the role of business 
in the creation of wealth, and the fact that private capital is essential 
for social  investment. ... [But] markets [cannot] nurture the human 
capital  they  themselves  require  –  government,  families  and 
communities have to do so. Market economies generate externalities, 
whose social implications have to be dealt with by other means. ... 
Government must play a basic role in sustaining the social and civic 
frameworks upon which markets actually depend (ibid, pp. 34, 36, 58). 
This is neither old-style social democracy nor neoliberalism because 
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Old-style  social  democracy  concentrated  on  industrial  policy  and 
Keynesian  demand  measures,  while  the  neoliberals  focused  on 
deregulation  and  market  liberalization.  Third  way  economic  policy 
needs  to  concern  itself  with  different  priorities  –  with  education, 
incentives,  entrepreneurial  culture,  flexibility,  devolution  and  the 
cultivation of social capital (ibid: 73). 
Giddens  then  goes  on  to  spell  out  this  agenda  in  detail.  In  the  domestic 
environment “product,  capital  and labour  markets  must  all  be flexible  for  an 
economy today  to  be  competitive”  (ibid:  75);  “third-sector  groups  can  offer 
choice  and responsiveness  in  the  delivery  of  public  services”  (ibid:  81);  and 
“social democrats should continue to move away from heavy reliance on taxes 
that  might  inhibit  effort  or  enterprise,  including income and corporate  taxes” 
(ibid:  100).  At  global  level  there  should  be “the  development  of  appropriate 
regulations providing for surveillance of financial transactions” (ibid: 126); the 
extension of IMF functions in the short term pending the creation of a global 
central bank (ibid: 127); a “global war on poverty,” subject to internal reform in 
poor  countries,  and the adoption of  “domestically  sound social  and economic 
policies” (ibid: 129, 131); the enforcement of competition policies nationally and 
internationally (ibid: 143); and encouragement to “corporations and unions to 
work together on economic restructuring in the face of  technological  change” 
(ibid: 150). 
Giddens may deny that  this  constitutes neoliberalism.  But it  is precisely the 
agenda promoted by the European Bank of Reconstruction and Development and 
the World Bank since 1990, and the IMF, the OECD and the UNDP in subsequent 
years (Cammack 2004, 2006). The antecedents of the Third Way are here, not in 
the social democratic tradition – in the 'second-phase' neoliberal approach which 
moves  on  from  initial  short-term  shock  treatment  aimed  at  dismantling 
structures  hostile  to  the  operation  of  markets  (deregulation  and  market 
liberalisation)  to the construction for  the longer  term of  enduring institutions 
which will sustain markets and capitalist disciplines into the future (a new and 
still neoliberal regulatory state). The policies Giddens recommends place exactly 
the same emphasis  on the protection  of  the environment,  the importance of 
education and the knowledge economy,  the need to discipline capitalists  and 
workers alike and to develop civil society, and the role of third-sector actors in 
the provision of local services. His only contribution to this agenda – taken up 
zealously by Blair and Brown since New Labour came to power – has been to 
dress it up in the language of social democracy in an effort to broaden its appeal. 
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In  sum,  The  Third  Way systematically  redefines  social  democratic  values  in 
order to give them neoliberal content. Casting himself as Blair’s Minister of Truth, 
Giddens offers New Labour a set of slogans tailored to the needs of the age: 
individualism  is  solidarity;  responsibility  is  emancipation;  risk  is  security; 
enterprise is community; opportunity is redistribution; inclusion is equality; self-
help is welfare. From which it follows, though he cannot say it, that neoliberalism 
is social democracy. 
Seven Steps to Heaven: Competitiveness is Social Justice
As the excerpt from the  New Statesman at the head of this paper reflects, by 
2001 Giddens was insistent on the need to reconcile the idea of social justice 
with the imperative of competitiveness. The manner in which he does so is best 
reflected  in  his  contribution  to  the  2006  Policy  Network  pamphlet  on  the 
European Social  Agenda (Giddens,  2006).  Here Giddens takes as his  starting 
point the Lisbon Agenda after its 2005 relaunch in the light of the Sapir and Kok 
Reports (Cammack 2007, pp. 3-6). 
We must introduce the concept of social justice into the core of the 
debate about Lisbon. It is not enough to make airy statements about 
reducing  social  exclusion.  The  lack  of  a  developed  analysis  of  the 
changing forms of social justice is one of the main reasons the Lisbon 
Agenda has proved so hard to implement. Those who have opposed it 
on a national level have often done so on the grounds that it promotes 
markets at the expense of the less well-off. We have actively to make 
the case – with evidence – that reform could promote social justice,  
not undermines (sic) it (Giddens, 2006: 96; emphasis mine). 
The  intention  to  reconcile  social  justice  with  competitiveness  by  defining  the 
former in terms of the latter is absolutely clear.  First,  the aims of the  Policy 
Network project, led by Giddens himself, are “to consider the structural origins of 
the  dilemmas  faced  by  the  EU  countries  today,  as  they  try  to  reconcile 
competitiveness, social cohesion and inclusion; to identify best practice in the 
European states over the past ten to 15 years, and to study how far it can be 
generalised from one country to another; and to look in a radical  way at the 
looming issues all the EU countries will have to face in the near future” (ibid: 
98). Second, in pursuit of these aims, Giddens continues to brandish the same 
'social democratic' values: “a belief in the importance of social solidarity, a sense 
in which everyone pulls together for the common good; in limiting social  and 
economic inequality; in protecting the more vulnerable members of society; and 
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in cooperation between the social partners” (ibid: 99). Third, though, the need 
for reform stems directly from the challenge of global competitiveness:
The need for reform of the social model(s) is plainly driven in some 
part  by  economic  globalisation  –  this  was  the  prime  theme of  the 
Hampton Court Council. Social and economic change is accelerating in 
other parts of the world – as is evident in particular by the rise of India 
and China as economic competitors, both of them having more than 
one billion people. The rise of India and China, and more generally the 
other Asian tigers, gives the lie to the idea that globalisation is simply 
another name for the continuing world domination of the US, Europe 
and the West (ibid: 100).
Fourth,  these  external  challenges  are  matched  by  the  internal  challenges  of 
ageing populations, and the relatively low proportion of the population in work 
(ibid: 101-2). Fifth, although the recommendations of the Sapir Report should be 
endorsed in full, the Lisbon Agenda, the Sapir Report itself and the Kok Report 
“lack  a  systematic  discussion  of  how  the  innovations  they  propose  can  be 
reconciled with social justice and welfare” (ibid: 103; emphasis in the original). 
Sixth, then, the idea of social justice needs to be pinned down in a way that is 
“down to earth, and easily operationalised”:
Such a formulation must be consistent with the dynamics and nature 
of the knowledge/service economy and the differentiated society that it 
has  helped  to  bring  into  being.  It  must  also  be  compatible  with  a 
society  in  which  aspiration,  ambition  and  entrepreneurialism 
necessarily have a central place” (ibid: 104). 
Seventh, then, Giddens unveils, courtesy of Wolfgang Merkel, a “down-to-earth 
scheme that is both simple and luminous”. This calls for (1) the fight against 
poverty; (2) the highest possible standards of education, rooted in equal and fair 
access for all; (3) employment for those who are willing and able; (4) a welfare 
system that provides protection and dignity; and (5) “The limiting of inequalities 
of  income and wealth  if  they hinder the realisation of  the first  four goals or 
endanger the cohesion of society” (ibid; emphasis mine). As Giddens remarks, 
“the devil is in the detail, especially in respect of point five”. 
The logic, however, is clear. In a familiar story (Cammack, 2001), poverty is to 
be addressed by equipping individuals for employment, in an overall context in 
which the size of  the employable  workforce is  to be maximised.  The welfare 
system is to be reshaped so that it supports this goal. One side of the coin is that 
individuals should be enabled to compete for employment. The other is that the 
competition should be as intense as possible. Inequalities of income and wealth 
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should  be  addressed  if  and  only  if  they  threaten  the  underlying  logic  of 
competitiveness. As Giddens expresses it when he returns to the Lisbon Agenda 
later in the essay:
Defenders of social justice see themselves as having to block efforts to 
make  some  of  the  less  well-performing  states  to  become  more 
competitive and generate more jobs. The argument needs to be made 
and  sustained  at  European  level  that  Lisbon-style  reforms  promote 
social justice and welfare rather than undermine them (ibid: 133).
In short, competitiveness is social justice.
Over To You, Mr Brown
The  same  view  is  reflected  in Over  To  You,  Mr  Brown (Giddens,  2007).  In 
general, salvation is through work, in terms that echo exactly the Lisbon Agenda 
and the UK National Reform Programme of 2005. Labour should look for policies 
“that help reconcile economic growth and social justice” (ibid: 102); traditional 
redistributive mechanisms should be adjusted if they compromise job creation 
(ibid: 108); and the “ensuring” state should also be a “social investment state”, 
responsible for coordinating the variety of agencies needed to help pursue the 
twin objectives of economic dynamism and social justice (ibid: 125). However, 
the  theme  of  competitiveness  barely  figures.  It  is  absent  from  Giddens' 
introductory account of Labour's record, and he later identifies security, identity 
and diversity as the three terms that “capture the main goals (and dilemmas) of 
left-of-centre political reform today” (ibid: 59). For all that the book is presented 
as a contribution to policy debate its structure, like that of  The Third Way, is 
essentially  rhetorical.  Now,  though,  the  intellectual  energy  of  The Third  Way 
(perverse as it was) has given way to sloganeering and crude partisanship. 
As we have seen, Giddens has come to an understanding of social democracy 
and social justice that is entirely shaped by the logic of global competitiveness – 
but he is unable to make this explicit without dispelling the illusion of the Third 
Way. So he shies away from addressing in any serious way the extent to which 
the goals of social justice and competitiveness can be made compatible at any 
level other than a rhetorical or discursive one.3 Instead, he opts for calling for 
fresh  thinking  while  repackaging  old  ideas.  At  a  time  when  New  Labour  is 
persuaded – whether in the guise of Mr Blair or of Mr Brown – that the issue of 
3 When Giddens eventually gets round to mentioning the rapid economic rise of India and China, for 
example, he can only remark that “How far their progress represents a threat to jobs in the 
industrial countries remains to be seen, but is now a matter of fierce debate” (ibid: 54).
17
global competitiveness is of central importance, this is a telling indication of the 
limited value of playing with words. For this and other reasons, the book does 
not merit extended consideration. But three brief examples will demonstrate the 
continuity with The Third Way, and bring me back to the issues announced at the 
outset: the diagnosis of Labour's failure, the treatment of David Cameron, and 
the inventive treatment of misfortune.
Word, Words, Words
Giddens' review of Labour in power is remarkably benevolent on the issues of 
poverty and inequality, and, equally remarkably, virtually silent on the issues of 
productivity,  competitiveness,  and skills.  He characteristically  decides  that  its 
major  weakness  has  been a  “failure  of  ideology”  (ibid:  28).  It  has  failed  to 
develop a “clear political vocabulary” to express concerns over the public services 
and  poverty  and  inequality,  and  it  has  been  “coy  about  its  egalitarian 
aspirations”, couching them in what Giddens describes, extraordinarily in view of 
his own identical  usage (pp. 11-12 above),  as “the vague language of  social 
exclusion” (ibid). Here Giddens simultaneously underlines his own tendency to 
propose verbal solutions to real problems, and the bankruptcy of his efforts to do 
so – a point reinforced by his insistence (rather late in the day) that “we should 
work out more explicitly what kind of capitalism we want” (ibid: 29). If Giddens 
himself doesn't in fact rise to this challenge, it is because he betrays throughout 
– in his uncritical endorsement of the Single Market, the independence of the 
Bank of England, macro-economic discipline, workfare, and the logic of global 
competitiveness – that he knows already, but won't say. It is a measure of the 
impasse in which this leaves him that he can simultaneously insist that if Labour 
is to win again “new ideas must be the driving force”, and that it must “stick to 
the key principles that have sustained it so far” (ibid: 61). And in fact the new 
agenda Giddens presents simply reproduces the old one, virtually point for point 
(ibid: 20-23, 60-65).4
Meet the New Boss, Nothing At All Like the Old Boss
The key to the rhetorical structure of Over To You, Mr Brown is actually Giddens' 
determination that David Cameron should  not become “the new boss”. So he 
4 As noted by David Miliband (Observer, Sunday 25 March, 2007). Miliband (as adept as Giddens 
himself at promoting the imposition of the disciplines of global capitalist competition as individual 
empowerment) is particularly scornful of Giddens' suggestion that Brown should campaign under 
the slogan 'Safer with Labour'. Miliband's, it seems, would be 'Power to the People'. 
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must be  dismissed as a “political lightweight” (ibid: 44). The problem here, as 
Giddens'  summary  of  Cameron's  views  indicates,  is  that  they  are  virtually 
identical to those of New Labour and indeed, on this account  (ibid: 38-42), to 
Giddens' own. So a double standard is applied. It is fine for responsibility to be a 
key theme of the Third Way, but when Cameron talks about social responsibility 
Giddens dismisses the idea as “an intrinsically vulnerable one” (ibid: 45); and 
when he spells out why, he pulls the rug out from under his own feet:
Responsibilities  have  to  accompany  rights;  and  third  sector  groups 
should  play  a  part  in  delivery  of  welfare  measures,  especially  at 
community level. However, it is surely plain that such groups must be 
in some way regulated by the state and that the state has to continue 
to play the main role in welfare delivery. Voluntary groups by their 
very nature tend to be unstable, since they have no regular funding 
and depend upon a continuing moral commitment from their members. 
Moreover,  the activities of such groups, by being clustered more in 
some  areas  than  in  others,  might  reinforce  existing  inequalities  if 
government does not have a role (ibid).
These are founding principles of the Third Way, and up to this point Giddens has 
found them perfectly satisfactory. But no matter. Opponents must be trashed, 
regardless of the consequences for the internal coherence of the overt argument. 
Here, Giddens outdoes even Cronus, devouring his own offspring without even 
acknowledging paternity. Surprisingly, he asserts that the “New Tories” “lack the 
core element that has put Labour in a strong position over the past ten years – 
an analysis of the key trends in the contemporary world and how best to respond 
to them” (ibid: 45-6). But a glance at the official web-page of the Conservative 
Party  shows  otherwise.  The  first  of  six  key  challenges  Cameron  identifies  is 
competitiveness,  coincidentally  Giddens'  and New Labour's  key  idea  too.  The 
others are reform of the public services, social justice, quality of life, security, 
and globalisation and global  poverty (http://www.conservatives.com, accessed 
30 April 2007). Giddens could hardly have a more eager apprentice. The question 
for him is: if Cameron's Conservatives can endorse the Third Way so completely, 
how progressive can it be?
In Conclusion: Giddens' Trilemma
We saw in the analysis of The Third Way that Giddens tends to take a sunny view 
of the energising impact of risk. Here the same impulse is followed to startling 
lengths. He is uncompromising in endorsing the logic of global competitiveness, 
recasting social justice in terms of its logic, and urging upon government the 
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task of shaping the attitudes and behaviour of citizens accordingly. The logic is 
that  you  can't  have  competitiveness,  social  justice,  and old-fashioned  social 
democratic values. Values have to be reshaped in all areas of life in order to 
complete the alignment of social justice and competitiveness: 
There is a further conceptual step to take, .. especially if labour market 
policy  is  to  be  integrated  with  positive  welfare  or  well-being.  The 
relationship  between  work  and  non-work  has  grown  much  more 
complex  than  it  used  to  be:  it  has  become much  more  open  and 
malleable.  Being able to take advantage of transitions – losing one's 
job,  falling  into  poverty,  getting  divorced  or  becoming  disabled  – 
rather  than  being  brought  down  by  them,  becomes  extremely 
important (ibid: 113; emphasis mine).
Startling though this is at first sight, this is the authentic logic of the Third Way. 
Despite the incoherence arising from extreme partisanship and the determination 
to attach new meaning to the old and still resonant values of social democracy, 
Giddens is coherent at a deeper level. He is committed to the transformation not 
only of ideas of social justice but of all our ideas of society and of ourselves. The 
uncompromising logic at the core is that everything should be bent to the goal of 
making capitalism work. For this to happen,  a commitment to competitiveness 
has to be part of the general disposition of every citizen.
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